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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LLOYD LEWIS ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent ) 
vs. ) 
'LYNN S. PORTER dba LYNN PORTER ) 
HOUSEMOVERS ) 
Defendant and Appellant ) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 144 86 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by Lloyd Lewis alleging a contract 
between the parties for the performance of services in moving 
houses and for an accounting between the parties in the perfor-
mance of the contract. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried by the Court without a jury on the 3rd 
and 4th day of December, 1973. Thereafter, the Court on the 11th 
day of December, 19 75, made and entered its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment. At the same time, receiving 
the Defendant's Motion to Reopen the case or in the alternative, 
Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial. 
The District Court of Cache County on the 20th day of Janu-
ary, entered its memorandum decision followed by an order of the 
District Court on Jan 27th denying the Defendant's motion• 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the Trial Court's Order, re-
opening the trial and for an order to reopen or in the alterna-
tive, for a new trial* 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant and the Plaintiff of June of 1973, entered 
into an agreement whereby Defendant would aid the Plaintiff in 
the moving of pre-built homes from the factory to the con-
struction site of the home. Pursuant to the agreement, the 
Plaintiff moved a substantial number of homes for the defendant 
and as a result thereof, there is between the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant, sums due and owing, and offsets and discounts against 
said sums. 
The parties were unable to resolve their difference aniciably. 
Therefore, on the 20th day of March, 1974, the Plaintiff 
filed a Complaint in the above and entitled matter alleging that 
there was due and owing the sum of $11,922.30• 
The Defendant through the Lav; Firm of Hillyard & Gunnell 
in Logan, Utah filed an answer on April 16, 1974. One year 
later on April 17, 1975, depositions were taken of the parties 
and on October 20, 1975, Mr. Gordon Low of the firm of Hillyard 
& Gunnell withdrew as the attorney for the Defendant. Following 
the withdrawal of counsel of October 20, 1975, on October.22, 
1975, a Notice of Trial was forwarded to the Court and the fol-
lowing day, a Notice of Change of Attorney was filed. The Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the parties, a Notice of Setting, wherein this matter was set 
as a second setting for December 3, 19 75. 
Following the Notice of Setting, various attempts were 
made to resolve the case without success and on December 3, 
1975, the Court convened for the trial of the matter. The .'.-. 
Plaintiff was present being represented by his attorney, David 
W. Sorenson and Defendant's attorney was present, however, the 
Defendant and the Defendant's witnesses were conspicuously ab-
sent. Defendant's attorney, as the record shows ( See Pages 
1 through 4 ) was unable to•explain the absence of Defendant 
and Defendant's witnesses and moved the Court for a continuance 
The Trial Court denied the motion and the trial started in the 
absence of the Defendant and the Defendant's witnesses. 
Following a partial trial, the Court reconvened on December 4r 
1975, v/ith the Defendant still absent from court; however, with some 
of the Defendant's witnesses present in Court. The entire matter 
was tried before the court without the presence of the Defendant and 
the Court rendered judgment for the Plaintiff and against the Defendant 
in the sum of $9,078.27, together with Cost of Court. On December 
11th,... 1975, the court received from the Defendant, a Motion to 
Reopen Defendant's portion of the case for the purpose of introducing 
additional testimony, to which there was attached the Affidavit 
of LynnS. Porter, the defendant, in the above entitled matter 
or in the alternative a Motion for a New Trial. The same date 
as the motion was filed, the Court entered the Findings of fact, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the Defendant. On December 22, 197 5, twelve days after the 
filing of the motion, Plaintiff objected to the motion on 
January 6, 1976, the Defendant filed a brief containing memor-
andum and authorities. 
On January 20, 1976, the District Court entered its mem-
orandum decision followed by an order of the Court denying the 
Defendant's motion for a new trial. On January 27, 1976. the 
Defendant filed notice of appeal of February 20, 1975, requesting 
the present review of the Court's refusal to reopen the case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT THE 1-
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO REOPEN THE TRIAL FOR THE PURPOSE OF HEAR-
ING ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE. 
It will be noted that the Defendant first seeks to reopen 
the case for the taking of additional testimony, rather than a 
motion for a new trial. The motion for a new trial is a 
alternative remedy requested by the Defendant. 
The motion to reopen was made after the conclusion of the 
evidence and at the same time or prior to the signing of the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment by the Court. 
Viewing -the facts in favor of the Plaintiff at the same time as the 
entry of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Lav/, and Judgment. The 
motion is not only timely made, but prior to the rights, lia-
bilities of either party being jeopardized. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 




It is recognized by the Defendant that Courts must; in 
the orderly conduct of their business/ fix a trial date, conduct 
the trial, and have a conclusion to the matter within a rea-
sonable time. Recognizing this premise, the Defendant as soon 
as practicable following the trial, moved to reopen the trial 
at a time when neither party v/ould be jeopardized by the taking 
of additional testimony, at a time when the facts were fresh in 
the parties mind and at a time prior to the entry of judgment 
and the rights of the prevailing parties to proceedings for the 
enforcement of judgment were commenced. 
Rule 59 of the-Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that l'on 
a motion for a new trial in an action tried without . a jury, the 
court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional 
testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of lav; and make 
nev; findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judg-
ment:1' The rules themselves create a distinction between a nev; trial 
and a motion to reopen. The grounds being the same, but the impact 
upon the court and its procedures being different. 
Moore's Federal Practice Volume, 6A, Page 59.04, states 
as follows: 
11
 While 'the motion to reopen has certain similar-
ities to a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly dis-
covered evidence, its purpose is different in that the addi-
tional testimony may or may not be newly discovered; and the 
motion does not seek a retrial but the right to offer the addi-
tional testimony and evidence before the present tryer of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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facts has rendered the decision so the tryer, jury, or court 
may proceed to render a decision on the testimony that has been 
taken and the proposed additional testimony. Of course, the 
similarity between the two motions becomes more pronounced as 
the case nears actual decision. For instance, in a court case 
where the judge has not rendered a decision, but has indicated 
by an opinion or otherwise how he intends to decise, a motion 
to take additional testimony to supply in effect formal proof 
need not be treated as a motion for a new trial; that if the 
additional testimony goes beyond that, then the motion to take 
the additional testimony closely approaches that of a motion 
for a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence and 
the trial court may, if it sees fit, test the priority of the 
motion by the standards applicable to the latter motion.11 
"Like the motion of a new trial on the grounds of ne>;ly 
discovered evidence, a motion to reopen the case to take 
additional testimony is normally addressed to the discretion 
of the trial court and its discretionary denial or grant 
of the motion will be interfered with by an appellant court 
order only for abuse " 
At the time of the Defendant's motion to reopen the Dis-
trict Court had committed itself with respect to the decisions 
but had signed neither Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law,. 
neither party was jeopardized by the petition and the time element 
involved in taking additional evidence would have been nominal. 
See Haugen vs. U. S., 153 F. 2d 850 and the case of Bowles vs. 
Six States Coal Corporation 64 Federal Supplement 651, where the 
Plaintiff's motion to reopen was granted although there was not 
justification for Plaintiff's oversight in offering proof where 
the Defendant's would not be injured and the reopening is in the 
interest of substantial justice. 
The rules governing the motion to reopen versus a motion for 
a new trial appeared to be substantially different. In a motion for 
a new triail, the Court appears to have broader grounds of discretion Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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or denial and rightly so in that a new trial can be lengthy, 
time consuming, and a economic detriment to the parties in-
volved. Whereas, a motion to reopen, timely made, is neither 
lengthy, or does it have the economic disadvantages of a new trial* 
The Court upon granting a motion to reopen can limit the testi-
mony and scope; and therefore, effectively control the destiny 
of the trial. It would appear, therefore, that the range of the 
Court's discretion is more limited in an motion to reopen than 
in a motion for a new trial. Therefore where a trial court 
may abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a motion to reopen 
an appellant court might reasonably find no abuse of discretion in 
refusals to grant a new trial where the fact are exactly the 
same. 
It is, therefore, the Defendant's contention that the 
trial court abused its discretion in failing to reopen the above 
entitled matter to hear evidence illicited from the Defendant" * 
concerning matters of defense to the claims of the plaintiff 
-which were not available at the time of trial because: 
1. Not all of the documentary evidence had been re-
searched by the parites. (See transcript, P. 15) That Plaintiff 
did not have all the evidence available to him. (see transcript 
P . - 2 0 ) .;;:';•: 
2. That the Defendant's personal presence at the trial • 
would materially aid the Court in reaching a decision. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING FINDINGS OF 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 'AND "THE JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF, " . 
LYNN S. PORTER dba LYNN S. PORTER HOUSEMOVERS, an individual. 
The transcript throughtout its entirety until page 53 in-
dicated that there was a transaction between the Plaintiff and 
the Defendant, Lynn S. Porter. However, at page 53 of the trans-
cript, it is noted by Pauline McMillan, a employee of Lynn Por-
ter Housemovers, Inc., a Corporation. Her testimony is supported 
by Randall Yeates, TR 93 testinoney that caa Corporation Lz ov/ner 
of the equipment involved in the litigation and was the real 
entity which did business with the plaintiff and by reason it 
appears from the record that plaintiff should have brought in 
as a party to the action, Lynn S. Porter Housemovers, Inc., 
and the trial court erred in granting judgment against the 
Defendant who is neither a proper party to the action nor the 
entity that the testimony shows to be the party liable. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant concedes that his absense from the trial 
alone does not justify a reversal by this Court. However, the 
Defendant's absense coupled with the fact the the Defendant 
made a timely motion to reopen the case for additional test-
imony should have been given additional consideration by the 
trial Court. The trial court abused its discretion in failing 
to reopen the case to include the defendant's testimony as to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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such pertinent matters as the real party in interest, matters 
of defense, unknov; till the trial of the case. 
In an event, a new trial should be granted based upon the 
grounds that the evidence clearly shows the proper party in in-
terest to be a corporation entitled Lynn S. Porter Housemovers, 
Inc., and not the Defendant as an individual./ 
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of May, 19 76. 
PRESTON, HARRIS, HARSIS & PRESTO?! 
\Uff/l{ Aff-rfsCtedri CfT1-
George W^Prestofi 
Attorney for the Defendant-
Appellant 
31 Federal Avenue 
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